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Abstract. The science of evolution acutely raises the perennial question of humankind’s 
place in the world. How does the theological anthropology of humans as imago Dei 
relate to an evolutionary anthropology with human beings derived from ancestral 
hominid species? Evolutionary biologists disclose ever greater similarities and conti-
nuity between animals and humans. Is human distinctiveness simply continuous with 
other ancestral forms of life or is there any kind of discontinuity? The answers to these 
questions depend not only on zoological considerations but also on one’s philosophy of 
nature. The standard anthropology within the Catholic Church is the dual-origin model: 
the human body originates through evolution, but the human soul is directly created 
by God. This formulation, however, is not without difficulties, primarily for its seeming 
Cartesian dualism of a body and soul as distinct substances. This paper develops the 
anthropology of David Braine who, drawing upon Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and Lud-
wig Wittgenstein, clearly situates humans as animals in great continuity with them. 
However, as linguistic animals who think in a medium of words, humans have a form of 
life—a soul—that transcends bodily processes. Braine’s anthropology provides a more 
coherent anthropology to understand the continuity and discontinuity of the human 
person in phylogenetic relationship to other species within an evolutionary perspective
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Introduction
In the fourth century, Gregory of Nyssa made the astute connection between 
bipedalism and the human face, rational thought, and language. If humans 
were quadrupeds rather than bipeds and had no hands, “the various parts 
of his face would certainly have been arranged like those of quadrupeds, to 
suit the purpose of his feeding […] and the form of the parts of the mouth 
would not have had the configuration proper for the use of speech […] But 
now, as the hand is made part of the body, the mouth is at leisure for the 
service of reason” (Gregory 1994, §8.8). Nyssa anticipates contemporary 
evolutionary biologist Adam Wilkins who connects the evolutionary history 
of the human face to a mosaic of characteristics that evolved together: diet, 
nutrition, feeding behavior, evolution of hair, suckling requirements, brain 
size and complexity, language, and social interaction (Wilkins 2017, 212). 
Nyssa and Wilkins exemplify opposing views of anthropogenesis. Nyssa 
is representative of the Christian belief in God the creator of all things 
and has a Christian anthropology of the human person as imago Dei. God 
created humans with a fitting bipedality that bespeaks both the rational 
nature of humans who look upward toward the heavens and their royal 
dignity compared to other animals (Gregory 1994, §8.1, 4, 8). Certainly, 
Nyssa predates an evolutionary understanding, but Christian theologians 
post-Darwin firmly continue to profess a divine origin to humans in addition 
to natural evolutionary causes. A not uncommon position among mainstream 
evolutionary biologists is a denial of a divine cause to the evolutionary 
origin of humankind. Wilkins recapitulates implicitly the philosophical 
presumption that natural and divine causes are mutually incompatible 
competitors: “To appreciate fully what makes something unusual, however, 
we must understand its origins. If the object of interest is biological, and if 
one does not believe divine creation to be its source, that awareness involves 
understanding its evolution” (Wilkins 2017, ix). 
A Catholic Christian perspective applies a dual-origin model to anthro-
pology in which the human body originates through evolutionary processes, 
but the human soul is directly and immediately created by God. This 
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formulation, however, is not without difficulties. Its wording suggests not 
only a Cartesian dualism of the body and soul as distinct and independent 
substances, but also a god of the gaps, miraculous intervention by God in 
the procreation of each human being (Rahner 1965, 62–69).
The objective of this paper is to provide a more coherent anthropology 
and understanding of the human soul which affirms human identity as 
animals with an evolutionary origin but who are also intended by God and 
made in God’s image. First, the philosophical framework of creation ex 
nihilo will be presented to frame how one understands the non-competitive 
relationship of natural and divine causes. Second, a brief history since Darwin 
of evolutionary anthropologies and their underlying philosophy of nature 
will be sketched. Third, the philosophical anthropology of David Braine 
will be introduced to better understand not only the nature of organisms in 
general but specifically the human person as both animal and spirit. Braine 
emphasizes humankind’s animal form of intellectuality—language—as 
the key to the coherence of talking about “soul.” The article concludes by 
bringing Braine’s anthropology into conversation with the ecological and 
evolutionary concept of the niche. 
1. Divine and Natural Causes
The framework in which to think about anthropogenesis and the human 
soul is set by the doctrines of the imago Dei and creatio ex nihilo which “teach 
us that the existing universe is the setting for a radically personal drama, in 
which the triune Creator calls out of nothingness those to whom He then 
calls out in love” (ITC 2004, §66). Humans participate in an evolutionary 
play taking place in an ecological theater (Hutchinson 1965). This natural 
drama is also concurrently a theo-drama. 
Foundational to the compatibility between natural and divine causes 
is the distinction between God and creatures. Natural and divine causes 
inherently conflict with one another in a mutually exclusive zero-sum 
causation game when God and natural agents are conceived of univocally. 
Were God another being among many in the universe, then God’s actions 
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would be on the same causal plane as natural agents and in competition with 
them. However, this misunderstands who God is and how God acts in the 
world. God is not a being or “thing” at all. Thomas Aquinas identifies God 
as subsistent being itself, ipsum esse subsistens, whose essence is identical 
with his existence (Aquinas 1948, I. Q. 3, a. 4; I. Q. 4, a. 2). Besides God who 
is, nothing else exists save what God calls into being ex nihilo. 
A fundamental distinction exists between God and what God creates such 
that one can speak of an ontological duality between creator and creatures 
(Soskice 2010, 39). God’s distinction from the world is of a different order 
than the distinction of one natural object from another. This “Christian 
distinction” between God and the world reveals the relation between 
them as creation, which is not a scientific category but a metaphysical one 
(Sokolowski 1995, 31–34). Thomas identifies creation as a relationship of 
dependence upon God for existence (Aquinas 1948, I. Q. 45, a. 3). Every nat-
ural thing only exists because God is the transcendent cause of that thing’s 
existence at every moment. If God ceased giving being to something at any 
moment, it would not be at all. Thus, God creates—gives being—continually. 
Creation is not something that happened just in the past. It is an ongoing 
relationship of dependence even now. 
God is radically transcendent over created reality, but this does not 
oppose God’s radical immanence in all things. God’s transcendence is 
not one of deistic removal from the world, nor is God’s immanence one 
of univocity with the world (Tanner 1988, 45). The transcendent creator 
is also intimately present to all of creation. At every moment, God “acts 
immediately in all things” and is in them “innermostly” as their very source 
of being (Aquinas 1948, I. Q. 8, a. 1, response, ad. 3). As the cause of being, 
God does not compete, however, with the causation of the order of created 
reality (Burrell 2000, 169). 
God is not only the cause of all beings but also the cause of all causes. 
God creates things with natures to be causal agents themselves. A Thomistic 
metaphysics understands a distinction yet concurrence between divine and 
natural causes which must be understood analogically, for God is not a cause 
among causes (Roszak 2017). God is the primary cause of the existence of 
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all things, and he enables natural agents to be causes at a secondary level. 
Primary and secondary causes are both wholly necessary to explain some 
natural event. Primary and secondary causes do not act in a part-part relation 
as if God is partly the cause of some event and the natural agent a partial 
cause (Aquinas 1956, chap. 70, no. 8). Rather, each is wholly the cause of the 
event but at different levels. Scientists study natural or secondary causes, 
but they cannot study creation—the relationship of dependence something 
has upon God for existing. 
2. Human Phylogeny: Continuity and Discontinuity
In 1863, Thomas Huxley identified the “question of questions for man-
kind—the problem which underlies all others, and is more deeply interesting 
than any other—” as “the ascertainment of the place which Man occupies in 
nature and of his relations to the universe of things” (Huxley 1863, 71). This 
question is more than a merely biological one about where the human species 
fits on a phylogenetic tree. It is also about epistemology—what branches of 
knowledge are required to understand who the human person is—and meta-
physics—specifically the relationship between natural and divine causation. 
As a central organizing theory within biology, neo-Darwinian evolution 
purports to explain the origin of species and their specific characteristics. 
Neo-Darwinian evolution sees the human intellect on a continuum with 
all other species. Darwin himself hypothesized that the human mind was 
explainable in terms of natural selection alone. In his Origin of Species, 
Darwin barely touched on human origins. The “production of the higher 
animals,” particularly human beings themselves, Darwin would treat directly 
in his subsequent work, The Descent of Man (1871). In this latter work, Darwin 
applied his mechanism of natural selection firmly to embed humankind 
within evolutionary history and also to explain the unique characteristics of 
humankind, e.g., moral sense and intellectual powers. Darwin suggested that 
the similarities of behavior between humans and the great apes is “one of 
degree and not of kind” (Darwin 1936, 494–95). Human characteristics such 
as emotion, memory, and reason, Darwin sees present in various conditions 
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in “lower animals” and endeavors to provide “the probable steps and means 
by which the several mental and moral faculties of man have been gradually 
evolved” (Darwin 1936, 494–95). In this respect, human traits are not anal-
ogous but homologous with the traits of other species. Homology indicates 
a common evolutionary origin whereas analogy lacks such an evolutionary 
commonality. For example, the forearm of humans, the wing of a bat, and 
the fin of a dolphin are homologous; the bone structure of each species 
stems from a common ancestral form that was modified over time in the 
respective species. The wing of an insect and the wing of bird, however, are 
analogous, for they arose independently in evolution. Beyond morphology, 
Darwin identifies human behaviors, formerly considered uniquely human, 
as homologous and on a continuum with other species. 
Thomas Huxley forcefully argued for human continuity with other 
species, especially the great apes. Based on a “marvelous likeness of or-
ganization,” Huxley classified humans, along with the apes and lemurs, as 
belonging to the Order Primate (Huxley 1863, 83, 124). Humans did not merit 
a separate Order, but he assigned them to their own separate family—Anthro-
pini—within the primates. Six years later, Huxley divided the Primates into 
three sub-orders: Anthropidae (humans), Simidae (apes and monkeys), and 
Lemuridae (lemurs) (Huxley 1869, 99–100). Though recognizing structural 
distinctions in hand, foot, and brain, Huxley rejected any kind of physical 
“cerebral barrier” between humans and apes because of a fairly complete 
continuum in brain size among mammals (Huxley 1863, 115). 
Huxley attributed the origin of human traits to the same natural causes 
that operate universally in evolution. Huxley takes a physicalist view of 
nature in that natural causes alone can explain the “production of all the 
phenomena of the universe,” and this argues convincingly against “the 
intervention of any but what are termed secondary causes” (Huxley 1863, 
128). The same physical causes that generated various genera and families 
of animals are “amply sufficient to account for the origin of Man” (Huxley 
1863, 125). He sees no rational ground for calling into question the origin 
of the human species from the “gradual modification of a man-like ape.” 
Denying an absolute physical distinction between humans and other apes, 
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Huxley sees the human faculties of feeling and intellect as homologously 
originating in lower forms of life; human fidelity and motherly love are 
present, respectively, in dogs and hens (Huxley 1863, 130–31). Despite this 
continuity, Huxley explicitly emphasizes the “vastness of the gulf” between 
humans, who alone possess intellect and reason, and the “brutes.” Humans 
are from the brutes but not of them (Huxley 1863, 130). 
Alfred Russell Wallace addressed the continuity and discontinuity 
of humans in relationship to other species and applied natural selection 
to human evolution. Because of human intellectual abilities, Wallace 
identified humans as “in some degree a new and distinct order of being” 
(Wallace 1864, clxvii). Like Huxley, Wallace recognized both the “striking 
resemblances” of human physical homology with the “anthropoid apes,” 
and the “intellectual chasm” between them (Wallace 1864, clxix). Five years 
later, however, Wallace would reject the basic physicalist position of Huxley 
as Wallace emphasized human discontinuity, arguing that natural selection 
was insufficient to explain human moral and mental faculties that required 
“some form of purposive guidance connected to ‘overruling intelligence’” 
(Benton 2009, 33). Darwin remonstrated Wallace for abandoning natural 
mechanisms, worrying that Wallace had “murdered” their child of natural 
selection (Glickman 2009, 36). 
Darwin, Huxley, and Wallace’s evolutionary origin and phylogenetic 
classification of humans need to be distinguished from their underlying 
epistemology and philosophy of nature.
Many proponents of evolution, both in the nineteenth century, such as 
Ernst Haeckel, and today, such as Richard Dawkins, “shrink wrap” biological 
theory with a metaphysical naturalism which presents an atheistic philo-
sophical anthropology as intrinsic to evolution (Peters and Hewlett 2008, 85). 
It also presupposes a univocal causal order in which natural causes eliminate 
a need for divine causes. St. George Mivart, nineteenth century biologist 
and convert to Catholicism, accepts evolution but with a fundamentally 
different epistemology and natural philosophy than Darwin and Huxley. 
Mivart firmly believed in evolution and published works on primate 
phylogeny and placed humans firmly among the apes. In comparison to 
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Huxley who separated humans, higher apes, and lemurs into three different 
sub-orders of primates, Mivart proposed only two sub-orders: within the 
Anthropoidae, he lumped together humans and higher apes (along with 
monkeys, baboons, and marmosets); the second sub-order, the Lemuroidae, 
contained lemurs, galagos, tarsiers, etc. (Mivart 1864, 615). Mivart recognized 
a physiological and anatomical continuity, yet also a “wondrous chasm” 
between humans and the rest of the sub-order. 
Beyond the biological realm, Mivart rejected the Darwinian supporters’ 
philosophy of science and nature. He critiqued Darwin’s anthropology that 
identified humans as no more than animals, differing only in degree and not 
in kind (Mivart 1876, 180). Mivart sees rationality and “intellectual language” 
as a distinction of kind from the cognitive faculties of animals (Mivart 
1898, 189–214). Humans are intellectual animals and moral agents whose 
freedom opens them to an “infinite future” which is a profound distinction 
from all else in the “kingdom of material beings” (Mivart 1876, 180,184). 
Darwin’s anthropological error results from “a radically false metaphysical 
system” that eliminates the nonphysical and divine as causes (Mivart 1876, 
184). Darwin and Huxley analyze and categorize the human person from 
a purely zoological perspective. Mivart, an anatomist himself, recognizes 
the importance of zoological study of humans as animals, but he recognizes 
the nature of humans as compound of two orders—material and spiritual 
(Mivart 1871, 283). Thus, one must consider the “man in his totality and not 
merely from the point of view of anatomy” (Mivart 1876, 182).
In contrast to Darwin’s opposition of divine and natural causes, Mivart 
drew upon a Thomistic metaphysics wherein divine and natural causes 
can operate concurrently. Mivart wrote about creation in three senses: 
1) direct or supernatural action; 2) derivative creation or physical action; 
and 3) hyperphysical action (Mivart 1871, 252–53). The latter two belong to 
the order of nature and do not oppose a concurrent divine action. Derivative 
creation corresponds to secondary causation whereas hyperphysical action 
is voluntary conscious, intellectual activity. The human intellectual soul is 
hyperphysical. Within this metaphysical framework, “it is no longer abso-
lutely necessary to suppose that any action different in kind took place in 
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the production of man’s body, from that which took place in the production 
of the bodies of other animals, and of the whole material universe” (Mivart 
1871, 281–82). Knowing from Thomistic hylomorphism that the rational 
human soul cannot be educed from matter but is directly created by God 
(Aquinas 1948, I. Q. 75, a. 6, ad. 1), Mivart proposed a dual-origin to the 
human person: the human soul is directly created by God, but the human 
body evolved by natural physical laws of derivative or secondary creation 
(Mivart 1871, 287). 
Mivart’s dual-origin theory has become a standard position within the 
Catholic Church. Eighty years later, in the first papal statement on evolu-
tion and theological anthropology, Pope Pius XII recapitulated Mivart’s 
dual-origin model. Pius XII cautiously allowed circumspect scientific and 
theological discussion regarding the “doctrine of evolution, in as far as it 
inquires into the origin of the human body as coming from pre-existent 
and living matter,” but he holds firmly to the Catholic faith that “souls are 
immediately created by God” (Pius XII 1950, §36). Almost a half century 
later, Pope John Paul II reaffirmed Pius XII’s dual-origin model of human 
origins while explicitly addressing the question this raises about human 
continuity within an evolutionary framework (John Paul II 1996, §3,5). 
In the arc from Mivart to Pius XII and John Paul II, is the dual-origin 
model of the human person persuasive today? To a scientific community, 
many of whom adopt a physicalist or eliminative materialist position, any 
talk of an immaterial soul created by God is readily dismissed as fanciful 
and magical. The intervention of God from outside the natural causal 
nexus seemingly introduces a causal gap. Philosophically, the duality of 
a soul created by God and a body formed by evolution seems beholden to 
a Cartesian metaphysics in which body and soul are distinct substances. 
In between Pius XII and John Paul II, Karl Rahner engaged this specific 
issue of the dual-origin theory of human evolutionary origins (Rahner 1965). 
Critical to framing anthropology for Rahner, as for Mivart, is metaphysics. 
God as the transcendent ground of all reality and humans as a unity of matter 
and spirit are metaphysical starting points for any subsequent scientific 
epistemology. Holding firm to a Thomistic distinction between primary and 
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secondary causes, Rahner wonders if the creation of a spiritual soul becomes 
an exception to that distinction. He answers negatively as he explains the 
coming to be of humans evolutionarily as a natural self-transcending move-
ment, a becoming, however, whose cause and ground is absolute Being. God 
gives to the nature or essence of humans the capacity for self-transcendence. 
In anthropogenesis, God’s activity “causes the operation of the creature 
which exceeds and transcends its own possibilities” (Rahner 1965, 101). 
The next section will discuss the philosophical anthropology of David 
Braine who starts with an understanding of the unity of the human person as 
animal and spirit from which he develops a robust hylomorphic metaphysics 
and through an analysis of human language provides a coherent anthro-
pology in which to understand non-dualistically the dual-origin theory.
3. Language and the Human Soul
David Braine argues for a recovery of non-dualistic “soul” language in the 
context of understanding the human person whose animal form of life is in 
community with the rest of the physical and biological world (Braine 1992, 
496). Braine emphasizes that “what we say about the soul is always derivative 
from and determined by . . . what we have to say about this or that kind of 
living bodily being” (Braine 1992, 511). Braine’s main argument is that 
humans have a form of bodily life—linguistic understanding and thinking 
in a medium of words—that transcends the body and its processes. This 
transcendence provides a context for understanding the origin of the soul, 
or rather of the human person who is animal and spirit, by God.
David Braine presents an anthropology which seeks to preserve the 
unity of the human being, specifically as a living human organism, and at 
the same time to escape from the Cartesian dichotomy of mind and body 
which undergirds contemporary philosophical anthropology (Braine 1992). 
He first develops a fundamentally Aristotelian anthropology coupled with the 
thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein which fills the space between the deficient 
poles of dualism and materialism to restore the psychophysical unity of the 
human person, and then secondly, rooted in Thomas Aquinas’ anthropology 
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and understanding of esse, develops what is unique to humans as those who 
have linguistic understanding and think in a medium of words.
Braine draws upon Aristotle’s hylomorphic anthropology which provides 
a more robust ontology to account for and describe humans (and other 
organisms) holistically as unified bodily beings. For Aristotle, all living beings 
are living bodies, a unity of form (or soul) and matter. Contrary to a modern 
Cartesian ontology of universal matter which is fundamental to what exists, 
what is fundamental for Aristotle is not matter but primary substances, 
such as a daffodil, a damselfly, and a human being. Stones, bacteria, plants, 
animals, and persons do not share “one way of being a concrete thing or 
substance” but have “different modes of acting . . . and different logical 
types of relation towards other things” (Braine 1992, 144). As a substance, 
the organism is to be treated and understood as a whole, a psychophysical 
whole in the case of higher animals and humans. 
Aristotle’s notion of the soul as the form of the body is not a dualistic, 
Cartesian notion of the soul which alone has mental properties reserved to 
it. Thinking for Aristotle is a natural part of the life of humans. Descartes’ 
separation of the mind from matter, of Cartesian psychology from Cartesian 
physics, creates the mind-body interaction problem, but for Aristotle, 
“psychology is a part of physics, that is, of the general theory of nature; 
psychology therefore has an Aristotelian conception of matter built in” 
(Cohen 1992, 60). Humans (and higher animals) are psychophysical wholes, 
focalized subjects with irreducibly hybrid powers. This Aristotelian holistic 
view presumes an inseparability between perception and behavior such that 
substances, not events, are the primary agents of explanation and causation. 
Inherent to this agent-causality is teleological explanation of phenomena 
without recourse to mechanical laws of nature. The recovery of substances as 
agents also brings with it a kind of explanation of phenomena that material 
causation is insufficient to explain. Teleological explanation does not entail 
that “some end is an efficient cause” but that a richer explanation than the 
material or physical is needed to account for a phenomenon that relates to 
a new kind of ontology, namely psychophysical wholes which act as agents 
(Braine 1992, 230). Like Mivart’s neo-Aristotelianism, Braine’s philosophy of 
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nature rejects physicalism in that humans (and animals) are not completely 
explainable by the laws of matter and physics (Braine 1992, 289). 
Braine rejects physicalism and materialism because of holism and its 
intrinsic teleology. Humans and higher animals are not simply material 
entities or mechanical systems completely explainable by material or effi-
cient causation. Such animals are psychophysical wholes, conscious agents 
who act teleologically and not as billiard balls. Because the physical and 
psychological are inseparable, an explanatory account of consciousness re-
quires an “enlargement of ontology” (Braine 1992, 296). Braine distinguishes 
two structures of consciousness: the perceptual consciousness shared by 
humans with higher animals and the global structure distinctive of human 
consciousness (Braine 1992, 301). Though humans and higher animals are 
psychophysical wholes not completely explainable as mechanical systems, 
mechanical or physical processes are internal to acts of perceptual conscious-
ness, such as perception, imagination, emotion, and intention (Braine 1992, 
449). Distinctive of the psychophysical activity of human consciousness 
compared to higher animals is language. Braine argues that mechanical 
processes are not internal to linguistic understanding and thus indicates 
the non-dualistic transcendence of the human person over the body. 
Human animals are psychophysical wholes who have the capacity for 
using language, and this characteristic distinguishes human animals from 
all other animals. Speech is not something belonging to a disembodied 
mind but is a proper animal activity as it involves voice produced by bodily 
parts such as lungs, pharynx, tongue, teeth, and lips. Braine does not begin, 
as Thomas Aquinas does, with thinking and understanding, “but with the 
particular kind of psychophysical activity which defines the difference 
between the human being and other animals, namely language” (Braine 1992, 
348). Drawing upon Ludwig Wittgenstein, Braine’s central thesis concerning 
language and thought is that rationality can only be conceived in terms of 
what is “linguistically expressible” (Braine 1992, 351, 355). 
Just as the focalized human subject has a simplicity as an irreducible 
psychophysical whole, Braine argues that the subject of thought and the 
operations of thought also have a simplicity and indivisibility (Braine 1992, 
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400). This indivisibility and simplicity of thought does not admit of internal 
processes. The expression of thought has a teleology analogous to the 
teleology of psychophysical beings, which, however, does not exclude the 
role of the physical. Thinking requires the body for expression whether in 
speaking or writing, but given thought’s teleology and simplicity, Braine does 
not think that linguistic understanding or thinking in a medium of words 
have physical processes internal to them or have bodily states or activities. 
Braine distinguishes between two levels of language, namely langue 
and parole. Langue refers to the conventional meaning of words as dictio-
nary-items which have meanings in their own right. Parole refers to the 
meaning of language as used in speech; it is the use of the understanding 
of langue. Langue alone is limited, but its expression in parole opens a door 
to infinite possibilities. The fecundity, flexibility, and extensibility of the 
understanding of parole which uses words in an “indefinite number of 
logically distinguishable types of use” is lacking in any material correlate 
(Braine 1992, 451). Linguistic understanding also requires a judging subject 
and self-reflection. Braine reformulates Aquinas’ idea that “no material 
faculty can reflect upon itself,” as “there can be isomorphism between 
part of the material faculty and the whole but nothing corresponding 
to a judgement by the whole in regard to the whole—no reproduction in 
the material organism of the structure whereby the organism in critical 
judgement reflects upon itself or critically (reflectively) judges” (Braine 
1992, 472). Thus, Braine argues that linguistic understanding and thinking 
in a medium of words is not a bodily operation. 
Braine, like Wittgenstein, did not think there can be an organ of thought 
as there is an organ for seeing. The brain can be called the organ of expe-
rience, meaning that the brain provides a sensory interpretation of the 
world, but the human person as a psychophysical whole is the subject who 
sees, understands, speaks, and thinks. Thinking is not the operation of an 
inner organ but occurs in a medium of words such that the voice is a better 
candidate for the organ of thought than the brain (Braine 1992, 449–50). 
Wittgenstein’s demolition of the Cartesian domination of Western 
thought allowed a recovery of pre-Cartesian manners of thought, particularly 
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that of Aquinas who preserved the unity of the human person with his notion 
of the soul as the subsistent form of the body and who also like Wittgenstein 
argued that there is no organ of thought in the body (McCabe 2005, 2). 
Braine draws upon the linguistic parallel between Aquinas and Wittgenstein. 
Aquinas had a “keen attention to logic and language,” specifically in relation 
to thought, understanding, and his theory of the knowledge of reality and of 
God (Burrell 2008, xii). His treatment of thinking and knowing anticipated 
what “Wittgenstein says about meaning and understanding” (Davies 2005, 
xii). Braine explains the essential connection between thought and language 
by starting from the language end like Wittgenstein and not the thought end 
like Aquinas. Given this connection, Braine accesses the insights of Aquinas 
concerning the soul and esse to express the non-dualistic transcendence of 
the existence of the human person over the physical, biological, and even 
over death. 
The acts of human linguistic understanding and thinking in a medium 
of words are human activities which transcend the body. These are acts of 
a human being who, as Braine concludes by drawing upon Aquinas’ notion 
of esse, has an esse, an existence, which transcends the body (Braine 1992, 
537–42). Non-linguistic animals are types of beings, each with a certain 
form of life or way of existing. They perceive, imagine, remember, and 
suffer emotion, but all these operations of these kinds of organisms, all the 
operations of their souls, are bodily processes (Braine 1992, 516). Linguistic 
animals, however, have a new way of being or existing which includes 
operations (linguistic understanding and thinking) which are not bodily 
operations. Thus, the existence or esse of human beings transcends the 
physical and biological. The human soul, then, as the form of the body, as 
that which makes humans to be the kind of organisms they are, must have 
an existence or esse which transcends the body. Braine, however, emphasizes 
the holism of the human person as transcendent. The human being exists 
in its own right because he or she has “states and operations which are not 
bodily. And it is because we can speak of the human being as existing in 
its own right that we can speak derivatively of the human soul in this way, 
and not the other way around” (Braine 1992, 350).
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Braine’s anthropology and broader philosophy of nature allows a more 
coherent understanding of the dual-origin model of the human person in 
an evolutionary perspective, preserving the continuity and discontinuity 
between humans and ancestral hominids without introducing foreign 
interventionist causes. Because humans and higher animals both possess 
psychophysical natures, the procreation of any hominid (e.g., human, Nean-
derthal, chimpanzee, gorilla, or orangutan) by respective parent hominids is 
not a “merely physical process” (Braine 1992, 530). For non-human animals, 
however, their forms of life have no characteristics or operations which exist 
in their own right apart from the body compared to humans who do. The 
coming to be of a human being includes the coming to be of something which 
does exist in its own right. This is part of the ordinary course of nature and 
not a breach in the causal order. Thus, “the creation of the human soul is 
not the insertion of an alien element into an otherwise self-contained and 
self-sufficient physical field” (Braine 1992, 530). This is most coherent in 
a theological perspective of creation in which everything that is depends 
upon God the Creator for existence. The origin of any human person implies 
that “a creative act enters into the natural processes of procreation in every 
such human coming into existence, but such a creative act will not break 
the order of the world but serve to preserve it” (Braine 2013, 154). As the 
primary cause of existence and of natural causes, God causes the existence 
of a baby chimpanzee through the sexual activity of its parents, but this 
chimpanzee soul has no existence of its own apart from the body. In human 
procreation, God causes a new human soul to come into existence, but this 
soul does have an existence (esse) of its own. In either case, God is the cause 
of the existence and sustenance of the animal’s soul—whether chimpanzee 
or human. God does not intervene into the natural order in either case. 
Intervention implies a prior absence into which one enters, but God as 
transcendent primary cause is immanent and present in all things already 
as the cause of their existence. 
Braine’s philosophical anthropology and understanding of the divine 
creation of the human soul parallels Rahner’s in many ways. Both rely on 
a prior metaphysical understanding of God’ nature, the distinction between 
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primary and secondary causation, and the unity of the human person as 
animal (or matter) and spirit. For both, the origin of the soul is not a causal 
exception of divine intervention but of normative divine and natural causal 
concursus that illuminates the transcendent nature of the human person. 
Braine’s focus on language, furthermore, provides a context in which 
evolutionary theories of language origin can be explored. 
Conclusion
Language is the key to understanding the human form of life compared 
to other hominid forms of life. Language shows how human thought and 
existence transcend the body but at the same time require the body for 
expression. Braine’s anthropology situates humans well within the evolu-
tionary drama because it emphasizes the bodiliness of the human animal. 
It allows for understanding the biological homologies of humans with 
ancestral forms of life. However, through linguistic understanding and 
thinking in a medium of words, it also emphasizes the discontinuity of the 
human person from ancestral forms. Human behaviors become analogous to 
ancestral forms and no longer homologous (Sloan 2015). In the emergence of 
Homo sapiens, Braine sees language as expressing “discontinuity underlying 
apparent continuity” with other hominids and hominins. Braine thinks only 
Homo sapiens and not other hominins such as Neanderthals had linguistic 
understanding (Braine 2014, 233–42). 
The human situation can be brought into correspondence with the 
ecological and evolutionary notion of the niche. Anthropologists and 
evolutionary biologists locate humans within a socio-cognitive niche in 
addition to an ecological niche. Humans have a “distinct way of being in 
the world” given their language, intellect, will, freedom, cooperation, and 
culture (Whiten and Erdal 2012; Fuentes 2014, 245). The situation or niche 
of non-human hominids, such as the great apes, is one limited to present 
episodes and immediate responses to the environment (Donald 1991, 149). 
Even extinct hominins such as Neanderthals, Denisovans, and Flores did not 
enter the linguistic niche that Homo sapiens was able to enter (Fuentes 2014, 
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246–47). Because of language, in contrast, the human situation is global. 
Language lays the human person open to new horizons that transcend the 
local and immediate and even material such that “one’s perspectives are not 
limited to one’s immediate opinions and interests, one’s locality and tribe 
and its customs, but extend to questions of ‘fact’ or ‘objective truth’, the 
good and the right, one’s larger environment and community with nature, 
the cosmos and to God” (Braine 1992, 543). The human niche opens into 
the divine as humans are those animals who are capax Dei. 
The human animal is a person who has the capacity to enter into 
dialogue with the tri-personal God. The very word “person” derives from 
the Greek word prosopon which was a mask worn by actors on the theatrical 
stage that did not so much hide someone but made one’s dramatic face 
present. The Latin persona parallels this theatrical origin: “it was a mask 
that projected character per-sona, through sound” (Vessey 2014, 127). 
Humans have a wonderful kinship consanguinity with all the other actors 
on the stage, but they, who were formed out of the dust of the earth and 
who stand upright with the breath of God in them, possess a spiritual nature 
that bespeaks their obligate bipedality. They are part of the evolutionary 
play but also the theo-drama in which God creates them and calls them 
to share in his friendship. The origin of the human person evolutionary is 
distinguished by a linguistic relation to God. “The first Thou that—however, 
stammeringly—was said by human lips to God marks the moment in which 
spirit arose in the world” (Ratzinger 2005 “Belief,” 142). Humans are lin-
guistic animals who think in a medium of words, and with their face, long 
to see beyond the veil that obscures their vision, that they will see God face 
to face (1 Cor 13:12). 
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